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LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Lee Hargrave*

DUE PROCESS-EXECUTING AGAINST COMMUNITY ASSETS

State and federal courts in Louisiana are beginning to probe the
demands of state and federal due process with respect to the seizing of
community assets after litigation against one spouse, without notice to
the other spouse of the initial action or of the seizure. The inquiry is
an open, flexible one requiring recourse to basic principles and fundamental policies, for little in the existing case law establishes certain
rules.
In Jackson v. Galan,' Judge Sear of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that it was a denial of due
process to garnish a wife's wages to satisfy a judgment against her
husband, when "she was neither named as a party defendant nor served
with process of any kind." 2 On the other hand, the Louisiana Court
of Appeal for the First Circuit in Magee v. Amiss' found no defect in
a judicial sale of former (but unpartitioned) community property to
satisfy a judgment against the husband, when the wife had not received
notice. The spouses, however, had not recorded their judgment of separation in the conveyance or mortgage records.
Although Jackson faced the the constitutional question squarely,
albeit in a case with a scant factual record, Magee is not as directly
on point on the legal question and is distinguishable in a number of
ways. In Magee, the community regime had been terminated prior to
when the debt was incurred and to the seizure and sale; thus it involved
co-owners in indivision rather than in community. The case arose before
the 1980 community property revision, which established equal management of community assets and which made the notice problem more
complex than it was before. At issue was a debt for necessary repairs
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I. 631 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1986).
2. Id.at 415.
3. 490 So. 2d 322 (La. App. IstCir. 1986). Also distinguishable is Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Nata, 469 So. 2d II (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985), in which both spouses signed
the note and chattel mortgage on a vehicle registered in the husband's name alone. Here,
the wife was a solidary obligor, and at issue was a movable registered in the husband's
name alone.
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to the roof of a house, and thus the case is distinguishable statutorily
under the doctrine of negotiorium gestio or the rights of possessors of
property. 4 The decision is further supportable on statutory grounds, since
the parties had failed to record judgment of separation that terminated
the community in the mortgage or conveyance records. Thus, under
Louisiana Revised Statutes (La. R.S.) 9:2721, it was a "judgment ...
relating to or affecting" immovable property, ineffective as to third
persons. Nonetheless, Magee addresses the constitutional question in
dictum and will be discussed here in light of its similarity to the situation
of spouses who have an undivided co-ownership in each asset of the
community.
The Substantive Law
The community property revision effective in 1980 established a
regime in which spouses have equal ability to make community assets
available to creditors for satisfaction of debts. Civil Code article 2345
allows a creditor of either spouse, during the existence of the community,
to satisfy an obligation by executing against that spouse's separate
property and all the community assets. It matters not whether the
obligation is a separate debt or a community debt, nor whether it arose
before the marriage.' Though some obligations require the consent of
both spouses to be valid, 6 most debts do not, and it is possible for one
spouse to incur substantial liabilities without the consent (or even the
knowledge) of the other. Article 2345 is silent regarding notice to the
other spouse when a creditor seeks to reach community property. The
Code also fails to provide any procedure for the marshalling of assets
or for establishing a priority for separate or community property to be
reached first to satisfy different kinds of debts.' It is basically the
creditor's choice in this regard.
After termination of the community, article 2357 applies and makes
available to then-existing creditors the same patrimonial mass that existed
at termination. Obligations incurred before termination can be satisfied
by the separate property of the spouse who incurred the obligation and
by "property of the former community," '8 without regard to which
spouse now owns the asset. Again, the Civil Code makes no mention

4. La. Civ. Code art. 2314 (repealed 1979); La. Civ. Code arts. 527, 528.
5. Spaht & Samuel, Equal Management Revisted: 1979 Legislative Modifications of

the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law, 40 La. L. Rev. 83 (1979).
6. La. Civ. Code art. 2347.
7. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 5,at 122-28; Note, Termination of the Community,
42 La. L. Rev. 789 (1982).
8. Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Matrimonial Regimes, 43 La. L.
Rev. 513, 517 (1982); Note, Termination of the Community, 42 La. L. Rev. 789, 791
(1982).
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of notice or preference for one type of property or another. The basic
policy is simply that community assets are available to satisfy the debts
of each spouse.
Substantive Due Process
Little has been written suggesting that the substantive law scheme
just described results in a violation of due process. The argument would
be that inadequate governmental interest exists to support depriving a
spouse of property to satisfy another's debt. One answer would be that
the non-incurring spouse is given equal power to reach community assets.
More importantly, the provision is part of a larger scheme which grants
to each spouse, whether earning income or not, a share in the gains
for contributing to the ongoing household. Sharing the burden of the
debts seems to be a logical corollary to sharing the gains. It would be
hard to defend a scheme making spouses personally liable for the debts
of the other, but the Louisiana scheme does not do this. 9 It only makes
the existing community assets available to the creditor. The spouses can
protect future assets by either keeping them out of the community or
by terminating the community.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held it is not a denial of due
process for the state to forfeit community seines, trawls and other fishing
equipment used by husbands in violating the shrimping laws.' 0 Since the
1980 revision, the wife is equal to the husband in managing or representing the community, but that should not change the underlying conclusion that the non-violating spouse's interest could be constitutionally
taken. More broadly, the Louisiana view has been that forfeiture statutes
can be applied to the property of innocent owners."
The United States Supreme Court took a similar view in CaleroToledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.' 2 The owner of a yacht claimed
a denial of due process when the government sought to forfeit the yacht
because of its use in illegal activity by a lessee. The court permitted
the forfeiture, even though there had been no proof of the owner's
participation in the crime, because "no allegation ha[d] been made or
proof offered that the company did all that it reasonably could to avoid
having its property put to an unlawful use."' 3
That harsh approach may be weakening slightly. Recent statutory
developments in Louisiana disclose a view that such punishment of

9. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984-Louisiana Constitutional Law,
45 La. L. Rev. 397, 401 (1984).
10. 254 La. 988, 229 So. 2d 72 (1969).
II. State v. Bellande, 241 La. 213, 128 So. 2d 14 (1961); State v. Sonnier, 242 La.
220, 135 So. 2d 472 (1962).
12. 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080 (1974).
13. Id. at 690, 94 S.Ct. at 2095.
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innocent persons is unfair. The mini-RICO statute, which provides for
forfeiture of property obtained by illegal drug activity, specifically states
that "[n]o forfeiture or disposition under this Section shall affect the
rights of factually innocent persons.' ' 4 Such innocent persons include
those holding a "mortgage, lien, privilege, or other security interest
recognized under the laws of Louisiana," as well as those with an
"ownership interest in indivision."'' Continuing statutory development
along these lines may support the view that the governmental interest
here is not so strong in a due process analysis, when a person "did all
that it reasonably could" to prevent the conduct resulting in the forfeiture
or the seizure. If so, one could make a similar argument that the property
of an "innocent" spouse should not be seized to satisfy another's debt
when that spouse did what was reasonable to prevent it.
The Procedural Scheme
Since the community is not a separate legal entity, it cannot be
sued.' 6 Because under the prior law, only the husband could manage
community assets or incur community debts, the Code of Civil Procedure
simply provided that the "husband is the proper defendant in an action
to enforce an obligation against the marital community."'' 7 In case of
doubt whether an obligation was community or a separate obligation
of the wife, the spouses could be sued in the alternative. The Code of
Civil Procedure said nothing about suing them jointly.' 8 When the
substantive community property revision was adopted in 1980, the procedural rule was changed to make either spouse the proper defendant
"in an action to enforce an obligation against community property."' 9
Exception is made if one spouse is the "managing spouse with respect20
to the obligation sought to be enforced against community property."
When the character of the obligation is not certain the spouses may be
sued in the alternative. Also added was the provision that when only
one spouse is sued, the other is not an indispensable party, but only a
necessary party. Nevertheless, to prevent "an injustice to that spouse," ' 21
the court may order joinder of the spouse on its own motion.

14. La.
15. Id.
16. See
721 (1965).
17. La.
18. Cf.
spouses.
19. La.
20. Id.
21. Id.

R.S. 15:1356 (Supp. 1986).
Comment, The Juridical Nature of the Marital Community, 25 La. L. Rev.
Code Civ. P. art. 735 (amended 1979).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-215 (1976) which provides for jointly suing the
Code Civ. P. art. 735 (amended by 1979 La. Acts 711, § 3).
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Under old Code of Civil Procedure article 735, some doubt might
have existed as to the meaning of an action to "enforce an obligation
against the marital community." That terminology was imprecise, for
the community is not a separate entity with a juridical personality. The
reference had to be a community debt or obligation. The imprecision
caused no serious problem, however, for the husband was the sole
manager of the community and whatever actions were involved had to
be against him.
Amended article 735 also imprecisely refers to an action to "enforce
an obligation against community property." Strictly construed, this is
a reference to in rem or quasi-in-rem proceedings or to an action to
enforce a judgment already rendered. It would not include a personal
action which, if carried to judgment, could result in execution against
community property. Confusion is caused, however, by the reference in
the second paragraph of the same article to "a community obligation
or the separate obligation," suggesting that the initial personal action
is in fact contemplated.
Here again, the problem may not be serious, for basic due process
requirements will overshadow article 735 and provide the overriding rule.
Since the community is not a separate entity, one or both of the spouses
will have to be sued, depending on the grounds for the suit. In a
contractual dispute, the spouse in privity should be sued; in a tort suit,
the tortfeasor should be called to defend. A plaintiff wanting to assert
a right against a married person living under the community regime
must assert it against that person or his agent. It seems clear it would
be a violation of due process to obtain a personal judgment against a
person without that person being sued. 22 No principle of agency or
substantive marriage law would make one person the other's agent for
litigation purposes absent some consent.
If one were to follow article 735 literally and seek a personal
judgment against one spouse by sueing, giving notice to, and litigating
with the other spouse, without the consent or presence of the first, the
23
judgment would be a nullity as well as a violation of due process.
Justification for such a drastic departure from basic notions of fairness
would be virtually nonexistent. If the spouses are living together, there
would probably be jurisdiction over the other. If a spouse is incapable,
the interdiction procedure is available. 24 If the spouse is absent, the
absentee procedure is simple. 25 Little governmental interest exists to

22. E.g., Shaw v. Phillips Crane & Rigging, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tex. 1982),
appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1191, 103 S. Ct.
1169 (1983).
23. Id.

24. La. Civ. Code arts. 389-426; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 4541 et. seq.
25. La. Civ. Code arts. 57-79; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 2674, 5091 et. seq.
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justify a judgment against a person without that person's participation.
Furthermore, what would one have against the spouse who is sued? A
personal judgment? Apparently not, for that person would not be the
one who engaged in the contract or committed the tort, and there would
be no substantive basis for that person being bound.36
Procedural Due Process-Notice
The most serious problem in this area is one that article 735 does
not address-whether the nonparty spouse must be notified (a) of the
initial lawsuit on the obligation, or (b) of the action to enforce a
judgment by seizure and sale or garnishment of community property.
In Jackson v.Galan, 7 no notice was given to a wife of a suit against
her husband to collect a note. Furthermore, she received no notice of
an action to satisfy the obligation under the note against her employer
that resulted in garnishing her wages. The court did not distinguish
between these two types of notice. Failure to give notice of the seizure
is easier to fit into the existing case law, as discussed later, but the
court indicated that more was involved. The court pointed out that,
because the wife was only a necessary and not an indispensable party,
and because the husband did not object to this nonjoinder in the initial
suit, the wife was "placed in the inauspicious position of having ...
her property placed at peril of seizure with neither notice nor hearing." 8
Since state action existed in the use of the state's enforcement powers,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 could be invoked, resulting in the possibility of damages
and injunctive relief.
Five years earlier, Judge Mitchell of the Eastern District, in an
unpublished opinion, ruled similarly in Williams v. First National Bank
of Commerce. "9 He ruled that seizures under fieri facias of a nonparty
spouse's interest in community property would violate due process if
that spouse was not served with the citation and petition in the initial
action, and not placed on notice that the judgment issued could be
executed against community property, including wages. Thus, he held
that a minimally acceptable procedure required citation and notice, granting the nonparty spouse the same delays for pleading in the action
available to the parties, and /notice that the judgment could be satisfied
by seizing community property.
On the other hand, Judge Dawkins of the Western District in Bonner
v. B. W. Utilities Inc.," ° seemed to focus on notice of the foreclosure

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See W. McClanahan, Community Property Law in the United States 496 (1982).
631 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1986).
Id.at 412.
No. 79-3185 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 1981).
452 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. La. 1978).
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under Louisiana's executory process. In executory process, of course,
the underlying cause of action is not litigated under the confession of
judgment theory that supports such process. 3 Therefore, the court concluded: "The very least a person may expect before the State seizes and
sells his real property . . . is that a reasonable attempt will be made to
notify him of the proceedings." 32 In Bonner, the plaintiff, who was not
notified of the seizure, owned residential property subject to a mortgage
granted by a prior owner. The reasoning was similar to that employed
in Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams,33 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that a mortgagee of property was entitled to some
notice of a tax sale of the property after the owner's failure to pay
taxes.
Judge Tate's Fifth Circuit opinion in Myers v. United States34 provides a strong analogy. The buyer of property at a foreclosure sale
argued that the procedure allowing the United States to levy on private
property to enforce its tax assessments was unconstitutional. The United
States was not notified of the sale, and thus the United States' lien was
not discharged.35 The buyer asserted that granting an opportunity to
contest the levy was not enough; there should also be, he insisted, the
opportunity to contest the validity of the underlying tax assessment that
provided the basis for making the levy. The court disagreed: "However,
we perceive no constitutional infirmity in that restriction.1 3 6 Considering
the strong governmental interest in tax collections and the taxpayer's
opportunity to contest the assessment, no denial of due process occurred.
It was adequate that the buyer of the property could contest the superiority of the lien, the means of making the levy, etc. In the same
way, one could distinguish between notice of the suit against a spouse
and notice of seizure of community property.37
In a due process analysis, the basic inquiry weighs (a) the citizen's
interest that is being impinged upon; (b) the government's interest in
proceeding as it does; and (c) the possible means to protect the citizen
interest while adding minimal burdens on the governmental interest.38

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

La. Code Civ. P. art 2632.
452 F. Supp. at 1303.
462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981).
26 U.S.C. § 7425 (1966).

36. 647 F.2d at 603.
37. See Note, Termination of the Community, 42 La. L. Rev. 789, n.51 (1982). A
similar approach was taken in Shataka v. Smith, 491 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1986), holding on statutory grounds that in an eviction proceeding against a lessee,
sublessees were entitled to notice to vacate premises, but not to service of process of the
main suit.
38. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); see United States v.
National Bank of Commerce, 554 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
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This is the inquiry under both the federal due process guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the state due process guarantee of article
1, section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The Louisiana
Supreme Court recently addressed the nature of this inquiry in Wilson
v. City of New Orleans, 9 in which it held the procedure for immobilizing
or "booting" automobiles that had received excessive parking tickets to
be a denial of due process. The inquiry, stated the court, is basically
a "cost-benefit, or balancing, analysis to decide what procedural safeguards are demanded by due process for each type of deprivation." '
The court in Wilson also recognized the importance of notice: "Persons
whose rights may be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order
that they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified."' 1
The Private Interest Being Invaded
By virtue of Civil Code article 2336, each spouse "owns a present
undivided one-half interest in the community property." This interest
is not an inchoate future expectancy, but a present interest under state
law. 42 It is also true, however, that this is a special kind of "ownership"
under which one spouse acting alone can transfer title to most community
assets to a third person. 43 A spouse's ownership is thus subject to
divestment by the other spouse, and arguably it should make little
difference whether such divestment is by voluntary act of the other
spouse or forced by the action of that spouse's creditors. It must be
recognized, however, that with respect to immovable property and movables registered or issued in the name of both spouses, consent of both
spouses is required for a valid voluntary transfer. 44 In those instances,
the interest being invaded is much stronger, for the whole scheme protects
each spouse against the other's acts with respect to those transactions
that have the potential for serious depleting of the community patrimony.
This situation is more akin to co-ownership in the traditional sense.
One can compare the intensity of this special ownership interest with
interests in other cases. Bonner involved the interest of an owner of
land subject to a mortgage imposed by a former owner. This is quite
similar to a spouse's ownership subject to dispossession by another
person. In Bonner, minimal due process required notice to the owners
subject to dispossession if those owners were easily ascertainable. In

39. 479
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. La.
820 (1970).
43. La.
44. La.

So. 2d 891 (La. 1985).
at 895.
at 894.
Civ. Code art. 2336; R.D.M. Corp. v. Patterson, 255 La. 301, 230 So. 2d
Civ. Code art. 2346.
Civil Code art. 2347.
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Mennonite, the interest protected was that of the holder of a mortgage
as against government enforcement of its tax laws. The interest of a
community co-owner appears at least as strong as that of a holder of
a real right of mortgage on property. The leading United States Supreme
Court case on notice is Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,"5
the Court required notice when the private interest was simply the ability
to contest improper management of pooled, small trust funds-certainly
something less than an ownership interest in property. The recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision in Wilson v. City of New Orleans protected an automobile owner against the loss of possession-again, an
interest in property less than ownership-as a device to ensure payment
of traffic fines.
It thus appears that the court's implicit finding in Jackson that the
interest of the nonparty spouse is as strong or stronger than those in
prior cases is on firm ground. Magee does not pursue this analysis in
great detail. It simply says, after an enumeration of Mennonite's facts,
that Mennonite is distinguishable. The court does not explain why an
ownership interest in indivision should be given less weight than a
mortgagee's interest. Magee also distinguishes Bonner without a detailed
discussion of why the ownership interest there-one subject to a preexisting mortgage-was stronger than the ownership interest in community
property.
The Extent of the Deprivation
If a plaintiff has secured a judgment against a spouse and proceeds
to execute against community property, the nonparty spouse is in the
position of losing all ownership rights to that property. In a few instances, the nonparty spouse may have a claim against the other spouse
in a final accounting for fraud or bad faith,46 but this is of little value
when the community assets are gone. In any event, the loss is extreme,
as much as in Mennonite, where the result would have been complete
nullification of the mortgagee's interest in the property, since the purchaser acquires title free of all liens and other encumbrances. 7
Notice of seizure of property or garnishment could also prompt the
nonparty spouse to seek a separate property agreement, to obtain a
judicial separation of property, or to act to keep fruits of separate
property out of the community. The community could be terminated
and future earnings and fruits of the nonparty spouse would be free
from liability for the other spouse's debts. Notice could also provide
the information that would make the spouse avoid alienating property

45.
46.
47.

339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950).
La. Civ. Code art. 2354.
462 U.S. at 798, 103 S. Ct, at 2711.
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of the former community, which in some instances under article 2357,
would result in future personal liability on the part of that spouse.
In addition to these unique community property devices, there are
the standard defenses which might be raised-contesting whether the
property seized is separate or community, contesting the procedural
regularity of the seizure, jurisdiction, etc. None of these defenses requires
contesting the validity of the underlying claim that resulted in the judgement.
If one looks at the failure to give the nonparty spouse notice of
the initial action, the possible harm is less clear. Although under article
735 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the other spouse is not an indispensable party, the court may on its own motion provide for notice to
that other spouse in the interest of justice. The obvious corollary of
that provision is that the spouse can do something to protect his or
her interests upon notification. Other proceedings, such as interdiction
of the spouse, if possible, or filing a suit for separation of property in
light of the disorder of the affairs of the party spouse, are possible
measures which the notified spouse could take.
The extent to which the nonparty spouse could participate in the
defense of the main lawsuit, however, is not clear. In contract suits,
the parties in privity will assert their interests, and in tort suits, the
injured plaintiff and the persons allegedly at fault will assert their
interests. The nonparty spouse's interests are more limited-protection
of the community property against a later seizure. If, for example, the
party spouse failed to raise a liberative prescription defense and the
other spouse wanted to do so, it is not clear exactly what could be
done. Determining the importance of the spouse's interest in receiving
notice of the action hinges in part on his ability to participate. Until
the extent of his participation is established, it is hard to say that a
serious invasion of his interest is or is not going to happen.
Governmental Interests
The primary governmental interest in the current scheme appears to
be to protect the rights of creditors by giving them a speedy means of
enforcing their rights against debtors who happen to be married. Ultimately, this should also produce-cheaper credit for consumers. Such
an interest is not as great as, for instance, the governmental interest in
securing collection of tax revenues, 4O or in providing for attachment of
ships without a hearing under admiralty rules, because the vessels can
49
leave the jurisdiction so quickly.

48. Myers v. United States, 647 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1981).
49. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. The Dredge General G. L. Gillespie, 663 F. 2d 1338
(5th Cir. 1981).
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The governmental interest may also relate to protecting third persons
who engage in commercial transactions with married persons, by relieving
them of concern over the relations between the spouses resulting from
their marital property regime. The third person tort plaintiff or contracting party ought to be able to deal as much as possible with one
spouse.
The policy concern that produced the current law, however, was to
provide equality for the spouses. Under the prior law, all community
claims had to be asserted against the husband and satisfaction could be
had as to his separate assets and the community assets. The revision
simply accorded these same rights to the wife. The wife's creditors could
now reach community property, too. Under the old rule, the manager
of the community would be given notice of all lawsuits and seizures
involving community debts and property. Equality, however, has created
the possibility that a de facto non-manager of community property could
be sued on claims that would put the property at risk. This possibility
was not so much planned, as it was the result of a desire for equality.
Indeed, the substantive law in this area, where the major changes
occurred, did not face the immediate problem. The best the revision
did in resolving this problem was to amend article 735 to read as it
now does.5 0 The amendment shows concern for the nonparty spouse;
hence the unique (and perhaps unmanageable in the traditional adversary
system) provision that the judge may provide for notice to the other
spouse on his own motion.
In any event, to the extent there is data reflecting a concern for
speedy and efficient protection of the rights of creditors, those interests
must be compared with prior cases. The Bonner concern was the samespeedy executory process-and the weight placed on the interest was not
sufficient to sustain the procedure without notice. In Mennonite, the
governmental interest in collecting its own taxes was inadequate. It would
seem that the same conclusion would be reached here: that the governmental interest is not particularly strong. This then forces more careful
examination of the crucial part of the analysis-what can be done to
protect the citizen while imposing only minimal burdens on the governmental interests.
The Weighing
The court's approach in Mullane is the guiding point: whereas
newspaper publication would be sufficient as to unknown or missing
beneficiaries, "[wihere the names and post-office addresses of those

50. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 5, at 135. (The Louisiana State Law Institute proposed
the amendment.)
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affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort
to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency."',
Similarly, the burden of notifying the spouse of a party would be minimal
when that spouse's existence is available from the public records and
the address from local sources. Granted, in the usual on-going marriage,
the spouse served will inform the other of the lawsuit or seizure and
discuss it with the other. But the cases in which that does not occurwhen one spouse is away; when the spouses are living apart or otherwise
estranged; when one is trying to enhance his or her economic position
to the disadvantage of the other-are exactly the ones in which notice
is most needed, and when recourse to the public records or other easily
obtainable sources of information would progduce the maximum benefits
with the least intrusive burden. In Mennonite, for example, the fact of
a mortgage and the identity of the mortgage holder were available from
the public records.2 In Bonner the existence and address of the subsequent owner of the property were available in the records.
Conclusion
Predictable solutions are hard to reach in a due process analysis
that depends so much on the facts of any individual situation. Although
state law, for example, does not distinguish between wages earned by
one or the other spouse in terms of availability to creditors, since both
are community, Jackson v. Galan is doubtless an easier case because it
involved the wages of the spouse who was not given notice. Magee,
perhaps, is more understandable because of the failure of the spouses
to record their separation judgment in the property records, and because
the debt sued upon was a necessary roof repair.
Nonetheless, in light of the cases just discussed, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that in suits against a spouse, the prudent plaintiff
will give both spouses notice if existence of the nonparty spouse and

51.
52.

339 U.S. at 318, 70 S. Ct. at 659.
The court in Mennonite stated at footnote 4:
In this case, the mortgage on file with the County Recorder identified the
mortgagee only as "MENNONITE BOARD OF MISSIONS a corporation, of
Wayne County, in the State of Ohio." We assume that the mortgagee's address
could have been ascertained by reasonably diligent efforts. See Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. at 317. Simply mailing a letter to
"Mennonite Board of Missions, Wayne County, Ohio," quite likely would have
provided actual notice, given "the well-known skill of postal officials and
employees in making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed." Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 397-398 (1914). We do not suggest, however, that a
governmental body is required to undertake extraordinary efforts to discover
the identity and whereabouts of a mortgagee whose identity is not in the public
record.
462 U.S. at 798, 103 S. Ct. at 2711 n.4.
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an address may be obtained from public records or other reasonable
sources. The prudent attorney will hardly proceed without that kind of
precaution, at least as to notice of seizure, and, since the burden is not
much greater, also as to notice of the initial lawsuit. The risk is not
simply one involving a theoretical constitutional law question: 1983
damages are at stake.

